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Abstract 
Economic impacts of agricultural carbon sequestration involve direct costs of 
sequestration management adoption as well as a variety of indirect costs and benefits. 
The nature and significance of these impacts are discussed. Spatial and temporal 
heterogeneity in agriculture is identified as an influential factor. Techniques to estimate 
the cost of agricultural carbon sequestration are briefly reviewed and compared. 
Mathematically programming is used to simulate carbon sequestration in the U.S. 
agricultural sector and to provide experimental evidence of the existence and magnitude 
of economic impacts. 
 
Key words: agriculture, carbon sequestration, cost estimation, greenhouse gas mitigation 
policy, mathematical programming.
  
 
 
 
THE COST OF AGRICULTURAL CARBON SAVINGS  
Introduction 
Agricultural carbon sequestration has been suggested as a relatively low-cost option 
to reduce net greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations in the atmosphere (McCarl and 
Schneider 2000). However, such a statement can easily be misperceived if used without 
further qualification. To begin with, the costs of agricultural carbon sequestration are not 
constant but vary substantially across space, time, and sequestration techniques. In 
general, the more carbon emission savings are targeted, the more it will cost. To 
efficiently capture the heterogeneity of costs, economists often use abatement cost 
curves. These curves show the cost of emission reductions (vertical axis) plotted against 
the associated emission reduction volume (horizontal axis). Abatement cost curves may 
display marginal, average, or total costs. 
Generally, farmers do not voluntarily adopt carbon sequestration techniques but must 
be encouraged or forced to do so through governmental interference. Thus, a 
comprehensive cost assessment for carbon sequestration can be useful for finding out 
whether an agricultural carbon policy is worthwhile and what level of regulation would 
be required. For example, policymakers, who want to achieve a certain level of carbon 
emission reduction, could use an abatement cost curve for agricultural carbon reduction 
to determine the necessary tax or subsidy level. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the nature of costs and benefits from 
agricultural carbon sequestration, highlight important characteristics, and summarize 
methodologies for estimation. For illustrative purposes, empirical estimates from a U.S. 
nationwide study will be presented. 
 
Economic Impacts of Agricultural Carbon Sequestration 
Carbon sequestration efforts are associated with a complex response of direct and 
indirect economic impacts. Each of these impacts can be beneficial or detrimental to 
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various segments of society. Direct economic impacts are defined here as all primary 
economic effects that take place at the farm level. Indirect economic impacts include 
the effects of agricultural market changes and changes of untargeted environmental 
qualities. Furthermore, if agricultural carbon sequestration arises as the result of a 
policy, governmental institutions will incur economic impacts from the specific policies 
put in place. 
Adjustment Costs 
Reduced tillage, tree planting, production of biofuels, and other carbon emission 
mitigation efforts cause direct economic impacts at the farm level. First, the acquisition 
of new capital and skills to adopt a new management practice comes at a cost. While only 
temporary in nature, adjustment costs are generally higher the more farmers deviate from 
their traditional management. For example, farmers who change only their tillage systems 
but keep growing the same crops are likely to incur less adjustment cost than are farmers 
who switch to new crops or manage their lands in a completely new way. 
Second, direct economic effects also result from increased or decreased factor 
expenditures that are permanently associated with carbon sequestration practices. 
Reduced tillage, for example, demands less machine power, fuel, and labor expenses 
relative to a deep tilling operation. The costs of planting, fertilizing, and other operations, 
however, may be higher or lower for reduced tillage depending on various characteristics 
of the chosen crop, location, and the alternative tillage management.  
Opportunity Costs 
Farm revenues change if carbon-sequestering farmers sell more or less of their 
original products and services or if they sell new products and services. With adoption of 
carbon sequestration practices, farmers often give up the opportunity to sell as much as 
they did before. The foregone revenue—also called opportunity cost—is especially high 
for afforestation, plantation of perennial energy crops, and conversion of cultivated 
cropland into grassland because farmers completely abandon their original crop products. 
Other carbon mitigation practices such as alternative tillage and fertilization practices are 
complementary to traditional production and result in less opportunity cost. 
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Opportunity costs also arise because major agricultural carbon mitigation strategies 
are competitive with one another. Farmers cannot implement conservative tillage on a 
wheat field and at the same time establish a permanent forest or plant a perennial energy 
crop to be used as feedstock in power plants. By choosing one mitigation strategy, they 
give up the opportunity to implement another. To appropriately capture the opportunity 
costs of carbon sequestration, the economic model should include simultaneously all 
major mitigation strategies as well as non-mitigating traditional agricultural production. 
Stickiness 
The overall effect of carbon sequestrating management alternatives is usually cost 
positive because otherwise the non-adopting farmer would loose profits. However, in 
some cases, soil and crop scientists have found alternative management to be cost saving; 
yet, farmers stick to traditional management. Increased real or perceived risk, cultural or 
individual stickiness to lifestyle related preferences, and lack of confidence in research 
results coupled with some scientists’ tendency to overstate the benefits of new techniques 
might explain in part why farmers deviate from a strategy of maximizing expected net 
returns. For example, a field with no visible plant residues remaining after plowing has 
long been regarded as a mark of excellent farming skills in the traditional farming 
community. Stickiness adds additional cost to agricultural carbon sequestration. While 
these costs cannot be observed directly, they can be estimated econometrically. 
Market Changes 
If farmers adopted carbon sequestration strategies on a large scale, the sum of all 
direct effects would cause important secondary effects, which should be addressed by an 
appropriate economic analysis. First and foremost, agricultural markets would be 
affected. Production levels for traditional agricultural products are likely to decrease, in 
turn causing prices and per unit revenues to increase. If prices of agricultural 
commodities increase, consumers of these products incur losses. The net effect on 
farmers’ welfare would depend on whether or not the increased per unit revenue 
outweighed the loss from selling less units overall. Welfare redistributions would be 
higher the more traditional agricultural production declined. 
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Market changes can also affect non-agricultural sectors of the economy through links 
on the input or the output side of agricultural production. For example, reduced 
fertilization may decrease overall fertilizer demand and affect the fertilizer-
manufacturing sector. Increased supply of biofuels may lessen the demand of 
conventional fuels in the energy sector. 
Environmental Co-effects 
Actions to enhance soil carbon sequestration are likely to affect other agricultural 
externalities besides net emissions of GHGs. Initial studies and basic soil science suggest 
that many of the environmental co-effects are additional social benefits rather than 
additional costs. For example, reduced tillage also decreases soil erosion because plant 
residues offer more protection from wind and water forces and because intensive tillage 
destroys soil particle links. Higher soil carbon contents, which are based on reduced or 
zero tillage, increase the soil particle links not only indirectly by not destroying them but 
also directly by increasing the amount of clay-humus complexes.  
Nutrient pollution of water bodies is likely to be lower under reduced tillage because 
of reduced erosion and higher nutrient holding capabilities. Because minimum tillage 
disturbs soil less, soil microorganism, fauna, and flora remain in a stronger equilibrium. 
Increased plant cover provides surface animals with more hiding grounds. Negative 
environmental side effects may result from increased use of chemicals, for example, 
herbicides, under minimum tillage systems. However, comprehensive, long-term 
assessments are still missing. 
Changes in agricultural non-GHG externalities may have substantial economic 
impacts associated with it. Less polluted groundwater, for example, improves human and 
animal health and thus can lower medical bills. Assigning monetary values to 
environmental benefits or losses, however, is difficult and much complex work remains 
for social and natural scientists in the future.  
Transaction Costs 
Private carbon markets are unlikely to arise because these markets require private 
property rights. Assigning property rights to clean air, however, would be extremely 
costly. Nevertheless, pseudo carbon markets may be established through governmental 
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regulations. The non-point-source nature of soil carbon sequestration may lead to 
management-based policies rather than to emissions-based policies. Management-based 
policies may not target emissions accurately and thus may raise the cost of carbon 
mitigation. Any workable agricultural carbon mitigation will also encounter costs of 
monitoring, enforcement, and verification. The non-point-source nature of soil carbon 
sequestration is likely to result in relatively high costs for these tasks. There are no 
empirical estimates on transaction cost for soil carbon sequestration. However, initial 
sequestration policies will establish demand for the development of low-cost monitoring 
and verification technologies such as remote carbon sensing. Thus, while transaction 
costs may be high for initial policies, technological development may decrease these 
costs in the future.  
International Impacts 
Carbon emissions constitute a global externality. The cumulative emissions from all 
countries are the major determinant for the degree of this externality. Thus, the domestic 
cost per unit of realized net emission reduction may increase if agricultural carbon 
sequestration implemented in a few countries increases agricultural carbon emissions in 
other countries. This leakage effect appears to be most likely for agricultural carbon 
mitigation strategies, which decrease domestic production of traditional agricultural 
products. Soil carbon sequestration achieved through different tillage management may 
not belong to this category because crop yield differences among different tillage 
practices seem insubstantial according to current research.1 Conversion of traditional 
cropland to biofuel plantations or forests, however, completely removes existing 
agricultural products. Consequently, agricultural product imports may increase from 
countries that have not implemented agricultural carbon policies. Increased levels of 
agricultural production are likely to increase emissions. To specify the degree of 
correlation between production and emission, comprehensive studies must be undertaken 
for many countries. 
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Variability of Costs 
Policymakers are often interested in national or global long-term assessments of the 
costs of agricultural carbon sequestration. Those assessments are further complicated 
because impacts differ widely across regions and change over time. 
Spatial Variability 
Spatial differences in mitigation costs are due to differences in local climate, soil type, 
and land management history. In some places, small management changes can achieve high 
net carbon savings while in other places even huge efforts may not sequester a lot of 
carbon. Regional differences may impact not only implementation cost but also opportunity 
cost of carbon sequestration. In very productive agricultural areas, the planting of trees may 
be very expensive because farmers forego significant revenue when moving land out of 
traditional agriculture. In marginal areas, these opportunity costs may be lower, and hence 
sequestration via forests or biofuel plantations may be cheaper. 
Temporal Variability 
Agricultural carbon mitigation options differ in their degree of sustainability over 
time. While biofuels could permanently offset fossil fuel related emissions, carbon 
absorption through sinks is only available for a limited time. The below-ground carbon 
sink of agricultural soils may increase for 20 to 50 years (Lal et al.) depending on the 
initial carbon level, soil and climate type, and the new management. Growing forests may 
sequester above-ground carbon for some decades longer. Eventually, carbon stored in 
soils or trees will reach a level of saturation.  
The impermanence of carbon sinks imposes additional cost on related agricultural 
strategies. The costs arise not only from vanishing revenues in the future but also from 
the volatility of sequestered carbon in light of uncertain future land management. If 
landowners get paid for the amount of carbon sequestered annually, payments will cease 
after sinks have been filled. Without payments, farmers may abandon carbon-friendly 
management and revert to emission-intensive practices. The accumulated carbon may 
thus be released. 
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Cost Estimation Methods 
Economists have used five general methods to estimate the costs of agricultural 
carbon sequestration: (a) farm-level budgeting, (b) econometrics, (c) optimal control 
(OC) theory, (d) mathematical programming (MP), or (e) computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) analysis. Below, these modeling approaches are briefly summarized.  
Farm Budgeting 
Budgeting (Francl, Nadler, and Bast) is the most simplistic approach, taking into 
account only the direct cost of mitigation incurred at the farm level. One major 
disadvantage of budgeting is the omission of substitution effects, that is, product and 
input substitution. Undoubtedly, carbon mitigation policies will promote emission-saving 
management through input and product substitution. Another disadvantage—closely 
related to the first one—is the fixation of all input and product prices except for explicit 
changes due to a tax or subsidy. For example, a carbon tax would be assumed to increase 
farmers’ expenditure on all fossil fuel based inputs by the amount of implicitly contained 
carbon times the tax level. Despite enormous weaknesses, budgeting is still used 
occasionally because of its computational ease. 
Econometrics 
Econometric models (Antle et al.; Pautsch et al.; Plantinga, Mauldin, and Miller; 
Stavins; Parks and Hardie) use statistical methods to explain farmers’ management 
decisions through various parameters considered exogenous. For example, an 
econometric model may explain the adoption of carbon-sequestering management 
through variables of soil characteristics (e.g., texture, depth, and initial carbon content), 
climate parameters (e.g., rainfall, temperature, and distribution), farmer’s attributes (e.g., 
age and education), and through a profit variable. The estimated coefficients can then be 
used to predict the cost of additional carbon sequestration. The major advantage of 
econometric models is the potential computability of standard errors on all estimates. 
Standard errors provide valuable insights into the uncertainty of econometric estimates. 
The econometric approach, however, has several drawbacks. First, it can be applied 
only to those strategies that are already in use by some farmers. Hence, it is difficult to 
examine brand new technologies. Second, the estimated coefficients of an econometric 
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model are generally valid only within the observed data range. To predict the cost of 
large-scale adoption of environmentally friendly strategies, however, econometricians 
may have to extrapolate far beyond the observed data ranges. This extrapolation may 
involve adding a substantial carbon subsidy to the net profit variable for carbon-
sequestering management and/or adding the same carbon tax on carbon-releasing 
management. 
Third, macroeconomic feedback effects such as tax-subsidy–induced commodity 
price changes are often ignored. Fourth, econometric estimates are subject to 
misspecification errors. Omission of relevant variables, which might be difficult or 
impossible to observe, or simultaneous inclusion of highly correlated variables may 
significantly affect coefficient estimates. Because variable selection is, to a considerable 
degree, subject to the econometrician’s expertise and data availability, the model 
specification that is finally chosen may be the one that best reflects reality. 
Optimal Control  
In an OC framework, the carbon mitigation problem is represented by a multitude of 
time dependent, differentiable functions. The dynamically optimal decision path and 
associated carbon costs are obtained by solving derived first-order conditions. Frequently, 
functional parameters are not explicitly specified. Nevertheless, general results can be 
derived through comparative dynamics. Such a method, while not revealing the 
magnitude of costs explicitly, shows how costs change as a function of various 
parameters. Because of its dynamic nature, OC is often used for forestry related 
problems. Empirical applications include regional or global forest models (Sohngen and 
Mendelsohn). 
One disadvantage of OC is the need for explicit functions in order to solve the 
problem. Often the functional form chosen is not the one that best fits the underlying 
behavior but is one of analytical convenience. 
Mathematical Programming 
MP (Alig, Adams, and McCarl; De Cara and Jayet; Garmhausen; McCarl and 
Schneider 2001; House; Schmid) has been used to examine alternative agricultural 
management at the farm, regional, or sectoral level. The scope of MP models ranges 
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from linear, static to non-linear, dynamic. The major advantage of MP lies in its ability 
to analyze not only policies on existing agricultural management strategies but also 
policies on new or proposed strategies for which sufficient historical data do not yet 
exist. Major macroeconomic feedback effects are accounted for in price-endogenous 
sectoral MP models (Alig, Adams, and McCarl; House; McCarl and Schneider 2001). 
Disadvantages of MP models include the tendency toward extreme, purely profit-based 
specialization. Often omitted in large MP models are so-called option values (Pindyck) 
arising from irreversible investments (Parks); non-pecuniary, risk related, 
unobservable, or otherwise unaccounted costs and benefits from alternative land 
management (Plantinga); and macro-economic impacts in excluded sectors and regions 
of the economy. In addition, MP models provide point estimates without a confidence 
interval.  
Computable General Equilibrium Analysis 
Computable general equilibrium models (Reilly et al.; Burniaux; Sands et al.) look at 
the whole world economy and are built top-down from the world level to country and 
sub-country levels. Similarly, goods and services, which are initially represented by a 
broad composite good, can be disaggregated into specific commodities. The level of 
accuracy often depends critically on how far down the model disaggregation occurs, both 
regionally and with respect to goods and services. 
The major advantage of CGE models is that potentially all economic interactions are 
accounted for. However, most current models lack necessary data for fine-tuned 
disaggregation and hence do not provide much region-, crop-, or management-specific 
detail. This disadvantage is noteworthy, especially in the field of agriculture with its high 
degree of heterogeneity. As computers become more powerful and data become generally 
more available, the accuracy of these CGE models may increase significantly. 
Model Linkage 
Although the above-described methods and models may appear fairly unrelated, 
there are several important links. For example, the data established for simple budgeting 
may be useful in econometric and MP models. Econometrically estimated parameters of 
demand and supply curves are often an essential part of MP models. In addition, 
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econometric estimates of non-profit related stickiness to traditional management can also 
be incorporated into MP models. Results from econometric or MP models in turn can be 
linked to CGE models.  
Models may be linked in one direction or iteratively. Iterative model linkage can be 
very useful for connecting models of different scales, for example, for connecting a 
number of detailed econometric or MP models at the farm level with a global CGE 
model. The regional farm-level models would be solved first, supplying data for the CGE 
model. Subsequently, the CGE model would be solved, supplying updated values for 
exogenous parameters of the farm models. This procedure would be repeated until 
equilibrium is achieved. 
 
The Cost of Carbon Mitigation in the U.S. Agricultural Sector 
In this section, empirical cost estimates will be presented using the U.S. agricultural 
sector model with GHG features (ASMGHG) as documented in Schneider. This 
mathematical programming model portrays farmers’ choices among a broad set of crop 
and livestock management options including tillage, fertilization, irrigation, manure 
treatment, and feeding alternatives. ASMGHG depicts production and consumption in 63 
U.S. regions for 22 traditional and 3 biofuel crops, 29 animal products, and more than 60 
processed agricultural products. It also depicts 8 crops being traded within 28 
international regions. Information from U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) farm 
surveys is used to represent basic crop and livestock production technologies. Several 
economic (FASOM, Alig, Adams, and McCarl; GREET, Wang) and crop growth (EPIC, 
Williams et al.) simulation models from the agricultural, forestry, and energy sectors 
were used to establish data for alternative management practices. These data include cost 
changes from the base technology, as well as yield adjustments, emission coefficients, 
and other environmental effects. 
GHG emissions and emission reductions are recorded for all major sources, sinks 
and offsets from agricultural activities for which data were available or could be 
generated. Generally, ASMGHG considers the following: 
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· direct carbon emissions from fossil fuel use (diesel, gasoline, natural gas, heating 
oil, LP gas) through tillage, planting, care operations, harvesting, grain drying, 
and irrigation water pumping 
· direct carbon emissions from decomposition of soil organic matter (cultivation of 
forested lands or grasslands) 
· indirect carbon emissions from fertilizer and pesticide manufacturing 
· carbon savings from increases in soil organic matter (reduced tillage intensity and 
conversion of arable land to grassland) and from tree planting 
· carbon offsets from biofuel production (ethanol,and power plant feedstock via 
production of switchgrass, poplar, and willow) 
· nitrous oxide emissions from fertilizer usage and livestock manure 
· methane emissions from enteric fermentation, livestock manure, and rice 
cultivation 
· methane savings from improved livestock management 
Carbon mitigation efforts were induced through a combined tax-subsidy policy 
placing hypothetical prices on agricultural carbon emissions and emission reductions. 
The magnitude of examined prices ranged from $0 to $500 per ton of carbon equivalent 
(TCE).2 Under the simulated policy, farmers have to pay the price for their own GHG 
emissions but receive payments for carbon sequestration or offsets. Methane and nitrous 
oxide emissions were jointly regulated, with equivalency based on the one-hundred-year 
global warming potentials of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 
Figure 1 shows the competitive equilibrium for major carbon mitigation strategies. 
The emission reduction impacts of all included agricultural strategies from all U.S. 
regions are grouped into three national abatement accounts: (a) soil carbon sequestration 
via traditional agricultural production (ASC), (b) carbon sequestration via afforestation 
(AF), and (c) fossil fuel carbon offsets via biofuel (BF) production. Note that these three 
abatement options are fully competitive with one another, implying that total acres used 
for ASC, AF, and BF cannot exceed total cropland in each region.  
At each hypothetical carbon price level, two implicit conditions must be met in order 
for a strategy to become adopted. First, the net cost in $/TCE of implementing the 
strategy must be below the imposed carbon price. Second, the net cost of implementing 
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FIGURE 1. Competitive equilibriums of major agricultural carbon mitigation 
strategies in the U.S. agricultural and forestry sector 
 
this strategy must also be below the net cost of any competing strategy.3 The paths of the 
abatement curves imply that ASC is a low-cost strategy, dominating AF and BF for 
carbon prices below $50/TCE. At higher price levels, substantial amounts of cropland are 
allocated to AF and BF. These two strategies have higher mitigation potentials but come 
at higher implementation costs. The increase in BF and AF reduces the amount of 
cropland used for ASC. Hence, the ASC abatement curve bends backwards at high 
carbon prices. 
To illustrate the concept of competitive economic abatement potential, two 
additional commonly used measures of abatement potential are contrasted with the ASC 
strategy in Figure 2. The technical potential of soil carbon sequestration is the 
maximum amount of carbon that can be stored regardless of cost.4 The single strategy 
economic potential, while taking into account cost, represents a situation in which ASC 
is the only mitigation option available to farmers. Two conclusions can be drawn. First,  
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FIGURE 2. Marginal emission reduction supply curve of agricultural soil carbon 
sequestration on U.S. croplands 
 
the economic potentials do not match the technical potential even for carbon prices as 
high as $500/TCE. Second, the competitive potential of ASC is substantially lower than 
the single strategy economic potential for carbon prices above $50/TCE. At these 
prices, more cropland is diverted from traditional agricultural production to forests and 
biofuel plantations. 
Economic impacts of U.S. carbon sequestration on agricultural markets are 
summarized in Figure 3. First, mitigation efforts are competitive with food and fiber  
production. High carbon prices lead to large amounts of afforestation and biofuel 
generation, causing traditional agricultural crop acreage to decline. Consequently, 
traditional crop production falls while crop prices rise. Second, the costs of using 
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FIGURE 3. Agricultural market effects from agricultural carbon mitigation efforts in 
the U.S. agricultural sector 
 
emission-abating practices are not shared equally among agricultural market segments. 
Agricultural producers in the United States would gain welfare because higher 
operational costs are more than offset by higher revenues because of increased prices. 
U.S. consumers’ welfare, on the other hand, decreases substantially. Slight losses in 
overall welfare would also occur in foreign countries. 
Figure 4 shows the impacts of carbon mitigation on a few selected environmental 
parameters. As carbon prices increase, nitrogen water pollution, erosion, and 
phosphorous pollution decrease. However, at higher prices, environmental co-benefits on 
traditional cropland largely stabilize. The financial benefits to society from changed 
levels of these environmental properties remain to be valued. 
If carbon credits from sinks are discounted, afforestation and soil sequestration 
become more expensive and the competitive equilibrium will shift towards greater 
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FIGURE 4. Environmental co-effects of agricultural carbon mitigation efforts in the 
United States 
 
adoption of sustainable mitigation options. To simulate the economic impacts 
numerically, two sets of scenarios were simulated with ASMGHG. The first set of 
scenarios imposes equal credits to all carbon emission reductions. The second scenario 
discounts credits for soil carbon by 50 percent and credits for tree biomass carbon by 25 
percent. These adjustments are representative of the permanence discount factors as 
estimated by McCarl, Murray, and Schneider.  
With discounting in place, agricultural soil and forestry shares decline but the 
share of undiscounted biofuel carbon rises (Figure 5). In particular, the agricultural 
soil sequestration maximum falls by about 10 percent while abatement through 
forestry adjusts down by almost one-third. The strong decline in afforestation occurs 
because undiscounted biofuel production represents a closely competing strategy. 
Small relative price changes can switch the delicate balance between afforestation and 
biofuel production a great deal. Soil carbon sequestration, on the other hand, remains 
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FIGURE 5. Effects of sink discounting on the costs of major agricultural carbon 
mitigation strategies 
 
the dominant low-cost strategy even after credits were discounted by as much as 50 
percent. 
Agricultural production is heterogeneous and so are the costs of carbon emission 
mitigation. Therefore, the composition of the optimal strategy portfolio varies regionally 
as illustrated for a few selected regions in Figure 6. Soil-based strategies are more cost-
efficient in the Corn Belt (high opportunity cost), while biofuels dominate in the Great 
Lakes region, and afforestation dominates in the Mississippi Delta. 
Direct measurement and regulation of emissions from agricultural sources is most 
likely impractical, at least until further technological advances are achieved in remote 
sensing. Management-based policies might provide a feasible alternative for the 
The Cost of Agricultural Carbon Savings /17  
 
FIGURE 6. Regional differences in optimal strategy adoption as result of cost 
heterogeneity 
 
intermediate future. However, because management is not 100 percent correlated to 
emissions, inefficiencies will occur, which will increase the overall cost of carbon 
mitigation. This effect is illustrated in Figure 7 for two alternative hypothetical soil 
carbon sequestration policies. The first policy is based on true emissions. The second 
policy is based on tillage management, where economics incentives and disincentives are 
imposed on different tillage systems.5 For both policies, the costs of monitoring, 
verification, and enforcement were ignored because data on these transaction costs are 
currently not available. The cost of inefficiencies from a management-based policy at each 
level of emission reduction equals the vertical distance between the two abatement 
functions. Given program costs of, for example, $2 million, the tillage-based policy achieves 
only about 85 percent of the emission reduction realized by an emission-based policy. 
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FIGURE 7. Program cost from soil carbon policies 
 
International emission leakage is a serious concern when agricultural carbon 
mitigation policies are implemented in only some parts of the world. Figure 8 illustrates 
this problem using three alternative assumptions on international implementation of a 
hypothetical agricultural carbon policy. In the first scenario, the United States is the only 
implementer of this policy. In a second scenario, the policy is implemented in the United 
States and in all countries that are listed in the Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, 
the third scenario portrays a worldwide implementation. The abatement functions for 
each scenario represent total carbon equivalent emission reductions from the U.S. 
agricultural sector. 
For low carbon prices, scenario differences are negligible. At higher prices, however, 
the paths of the three abatement cost curves diverge. While a unilateral policy in the 
United States appears to be cheapest, worldwide implementation seems to be cost 
increasing. Care must be taken in interpreting these differences. The abatement curves in  
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FIGURE 8. U.S. agricultural sector emission reductions for alternative assumptions 
about international implementation of agricultural mitigation policies 
 
Figure 8 show only U.S. agricultural emission reductions. Thus, potential emission 
changes in foreign countries are omitted. Because agricultural production in non-
implementing countries increases while falling in implementing countries, agricultural 
emissions in non-implementing countries are likely to increase. Assuming worldwide 
implementation results in almost no leakage, the deviation of the partial implementation 
abatement curves can be interpreted as a rough indicator of leakage. Equivalently, the 
vertical deviation from the global implementation curves is a rough indicator for the 
social cost of emission leakage. A detailed description of model assumptions and results 
for these scenarios is available in Schneider et al. 
  
Endnotes 
1. Several scientists estimate yield losses from reduced or zero tillage because of 
increased weed damage. Other scientists point out positive yield effects from reduced 
tillage because higher organic matter contents improve the chemical and physical soil 
properties and result in better nutrient and water availability. 
2. The magnitude of the imposed carbon prices is best illustrated using commodity 
gasoline. Given net carbon emissions of about 0.6 kg carbon per liter of combusted, 
fossil fuel based gasoline, a tax of $100 per metric ton of carbon would translate into a 
gasoline tax of $0.06 per liter. 
3. For example, suppose a governmental tax-subsidy enforces a carbon price of $20/TCE. 
Suppose further the net costs and associated carbon emission reductions are $10/TCE 
and 0.8 TCE for ASC, $15/TCE and 1.2 TCE for AF, and $40/TCE and 2 TCE for BF. 
In this case, BF production would be too expensive to be implemented at $20/TCE. 
The profits of the other two mitigation strategies would equal ($20/TCE-
$10/TCE)*0.8TCE =$8AF (ASC) and ($20/TCE-$15/TCE)*1.2TCE =$6 (AF). Thus, 
even though AF would be profitable at a carbon price of $20/TCE, it would not be 
adopted because its profits would be smaller than those from ASC. However, if the 
carbon price were at $50/TCE, profits for ASC, AF, and BF would equal $32, $42, and 
$40, respectively, making AF the preferred strategy. Using simple algebra, one can 
easily show that the optimal strategy in this simple example would be ASC for carbon 
price levels between $10/TCE and $25/TCE, AF for price levels between $25/TCE 
and $77.5, and BF for all carbon price levels above $77.5. 
4. The technical potential of agricultural carbon sequestration is usually defined as the 
difference between the current carbon content and the native, pre-cultivation (pre-
human) carbon level. However the native carbon level is not necessarily the highest 
possible level. For example, if costs did not matter, farmers could plant trees and 
deposit the harvested wood deep underground, where aerobic decomposition is 
limited. This technique would imitate to some extent the natural generation of fossil 
fuels, and sequestration would hardly encounter limits. 
5. To keep efficiency losses low, incentives/disincentives for use of each tillage system 
were calculated proportional to the sequestration/emission potential of each system.
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